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THE MARKET FOR GLOBAL 
ANTICORRUPTION ENFORCEMENT 
RACHEL BREWSTER* AND SAMUEL W. BUELL** 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
In a brief couple of decades, America’s enforcement of its Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (FCPA)—civilly by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) and criminally by the Department of Justice (DOJ)—has gone from 
practically nonexistent to one of the largest and busiest fields of corporate crime 
practice in the world. Corporate enforcement has been a growth area in 
American law throughout that period. No other area has expanded so rapidly nor 
so expensively for corporate defendants as enforcement under the umbrella of 
the FCPA. The broad statute prohibits covered corporations and their employees 
from offering bribes to foreign officials and political leaders for the purpose of 
advancing business interests.1 
The FCPA rested mostly dormant for over two decades before American 
prosecutors and securities enforcers eagerly embraced the statute at the 
beginning of the twenty-first century. In the nearly quarter century from the 
statute’s enactment in 1977 through the year 2000, the federal government 
pursued only fifty-two FCPA enforcement actions.2 No more than five such 
actions were brought in a single year,3 and in four of those years, zero actions 
were commenced.4 Then, from 2001 through 2015, the government initiated 379 
FCPA cases, reaching an annual high of 56 cases in 2010.5 
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1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3, 78ff (2012).
2. Stanford Law School, Foreign Corrupt Practices Clearinghouse, fcpa.stanford.edu (last visited
June 1, 2016).  
3.  Id.
4.  Id.
5.  Id; see also U.S. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Enforcement Actions: FCPA Cases (1978–2016),
sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml [https://perma.cc/6JWE-4FT9]. Not surprisingly, as the volume of 
cases has ballooned, settlement has become the norm. A recent study using an original data set found 
sharp upward trends, within a total of nearly 500 criminal resolutions of all types between the U.S. 
Department of Justice and public corporations between 1997 and 2011. See Cindy R. Alexander & Mark 
A. Cohen, The Evolution of Corporate Criminal Settlements: An Empirical Perspective on Non-
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This explosion in FCPA practice, as some have called it, is not limited to 
numbers of cases and settlements. FCPA prosecutions and enforcement actions 
include some of the biggest-ticket matters the government brings in the corporate 
sector. From 1977 through 2000, the government collected approximately $129 
million in FCPA sanctions.6 Since 2000, over $8 billion has flowed into 
government coffers from FCPA enforcement actions, most of which has been 
dictated by terms of settlements between SEC or DOJ and corporate 
defendants.7 
What has created this surge in FCPA cases? This article explores both supply 
channels for cases—the international cooperation between law enforcement 
officials that made more rigorous enforcement of the FCPA politically possible—
as well as the demand pressures that generate cases—the incentives and 
behaviors of U.S. prosecutors and enforcement attorneys. 
Of particular note on the supply side has been the government’s willingness 
to bring enforcement actions and prosecutions against foreign firms as well as 
domestic U.S. enterprises. The FCPA’s jurisdictional scope extends, roughly, to 
firms registering securities, headquartering, or principally doing business in the 
United States, as well as to any offense by any firm that is committed even in part 
within U.S. territory.8 Prosecuting foreign organizations and their employees for 
violating American laws against business crime—especially if non-FCPA matters 
such as evasion of economic sanctions or tax laws, and even organized fraud and 
corruption in international sporting institutions are included—has become 
normal where once it would have been seen as extraordinary. 
Part I discusses the changes in politics, economic thinking, and international 
law that have made this geographically broad enforcement strategy possible. For 
almost twenty-five years, the United States was the only country to regulate 
foreign corruption. Other major exporters, including Germany, Japan, and the 
United Kingdom viewed foreign corruption as harmless at worst and market 
 
Prosecution, Deferred Prosecution, and Plea Agreements, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 537, 540 (2015) (The 
study’s authors included all plea agreements as well as all settlements with sanctions not including pleas: 
so-called non-prosecution and deferred prosecution agreements.). Overall annual corporate resolutions 
rose from ten in 1997 to a high of nearly eighty in 2010. Among the eighty-six FCPA settlements the 
authors examined, only three (all pleas) fell in the period from 1997 to 2002, while seventy-three 
resolutions were reached in the period from 2007 to 2011. Id. 
 6.  Foreign Corrupt Practices Clearinghouse, supra note 2. 
 7.  Id. Looking at this data set of enforcement actions, total bribery also appears to have risen 
sharply. However, anti-bribery enforcement is at best a weak proxy for the incidence of bribery. 
 8.  15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3 (2012). One original data set of FCPA cases resolved by 
SEC or DOJ from 2004 to 2011, which excludes some cases given the authors’ analytic objectives, shows 
fifty-three actions against firms whose home country was the United States and twenty-five actions 
against firms domiciled abroad. Stephen J. Choi & Kevin E. Davis, Foreign Affairs and Enforcement of 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 11 J. EMPIR. LEGAL STUD. 409, 432–33 (2014). In examining all 
corporate prosecutions, not just FCPA cases, Brandon Garrett found that United States Sentencing 
Commission data revealed 120 criminally convicted foreign firms in cases brought by DOJ from 2000 
through 2009. Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV. 1775, 1810 (2011). 
Garrett’s separate hand-collected dataset of full corporate prosecutions showed 142 foreign firms 
convicted during the same period. Id. 
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enhancing at best. Witout foreign agreement that international bribery should be 
prosecuted, anticorruption laws were politically difficult to enforce. This article 
examines how the 1999 Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) Anti-Bribery Convention9 laid the foundation for an 
American prosecutorial strategy of robust extraterritorial enforcement. 
Though it might be too early to say that international business prosecutions 
are the great wave of the future, it is not too soon to develop theories that might 
explain the demand side: why U.S. prosecutors have significantly increased their 
activities in the realm of anti-bribery enforcement and the implications of that 
increase for regulators and prosecutors in other nations. American interest in 
prosecuting business misconduct abroad, especially activities involving bribery, 
is not likely to slacken. At least some other nations will develop a more active 
enforcement presence in the affairs of multinational corporations—thus the 
importance of understanding the forces changing the global enforcement 
landscape. 
Part II addresses the domestic political and professional forces that have 
influenced American prosecutors and shaped the American corporate defense 
bar. Internal incentives had to exist for federal prosecutors to spend time on 
FCPA cases. The domestic political and professional economies in which federal 
prosecutors work have shifted over the last several decades. Those changes have 
interacted with a changing global economic and regulatory landscape in ways that 
led prosecutors to the FCPA and rewarded them for their work there. 
Enforcement paths have been opening for other nations as well, in part due to 
the models and precedents that the United States has created. The future of the 
market for anti-corruption enforcement likely depends on how the domestic 
institutions and political economies of those nations determine the resources and 
zeal with which their enforcers pursue the activities of global corporations. 
There is now a market for anticorruption enforcement that, though still 
emerging, is itself globalizing. Several political, economic, and legal forces have 
shaped this market and will continue to do so. This article begins to develop an 
understanding of these forces in the hope that further literature will engage with 
these questions.10 
 
 9.  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Convention on Combating Bribery 
of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998) 
(entered into force Feb. 15, 1999) [hereinafter OECD Anti-Bribery Convention]. 
 10.  The literature on the FCPA is voluminous and growing. Most of it deals with subsidiary issues 
of doctrine and policy, or empirical measurement. Some work attempts to theorize the development of 
international norms against corruption. See, e.g., CECILY ROSE, INTERNATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION 
NORMS: THEIR CREATION AND INFLUENCE ON DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEMS 65–67 (Oxford University 
Press 2015); Kenneth Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Values and interests: International legalization in the fight 
against corruption, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S141 (2002); Rachel Brewster, The Domestic and International 
Enforcement of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, 15 CHI. J. INT’L L. 84 (2014); Elizabeth K. Spahn, 
Implementing Global Anti-Bribery Norms: From the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention to the U.N. Convention Against Corruption, 23 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (2013); 
Daniel K. Tarullo, The Limits of Institutional Design: Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, 
44 VA. J. INT’L L. 665 (2003). Other articles provide normative critiques of the law and its enforcement 
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II 
THE U.S. INTEREST IN CORRUPTION ABROAD 
For much of its early history, the FCPA existed mostly on paper. This part 
explains the origins of the FCPA and how it eventually became a forceful 
presence on the international legal scene. It examines how changes in 
international law, economics, and politics opened the door to greater 
enforcement of anti-bribery rules, which U.S. law enforcement officials later 
pursued. The international agreement to fight corruption did not lead to greater 
enforcement by most OECD states, at least not in the short term. Rather it 
provided an avenue for U.S. prosecutors to pursue FCPA cases against domestic 
and foreign firms with the investigatory and legal assistance of foreign partners 
that was, and to a large extent remains, the hallmark of the global anticorruption 
regime. 
A. Domestic Political Economy Of The FCPA 
Congress passed the FCPA in the late 1970s after the Watergate hearings and 
the subsequent SEC investigation of corporations’ political activities revealed 
that U.S. companies were bribing foreign government officials. Perhaps most 
notable was the case of Lockheed: the defense contractor received a $250 million 
government loan to avoid bankruptcy and spent over $100 million of those funds 
on bribes to various government officials.11 Though the FCPA is often described 
in terms of post-Watergate moralism (and it certainly was partly that), the statute 
was predominately a response to a national security concern.12 In the Cold War 
of the late 1970s, the success of the capitalist model as the ultimate winner of the 
global competition for economic and social ordering did not appear assured. 
National security interests were bound up in supporting a particular model of 
capitalism in which large transnational corporations were the major actors in 
global markets. As a result, revelations of corporate bribes to foreign government 
officials concerned members of Congress because they played into Soviet 
narratives of how markets were corrupted by corporations, controlled by capital-
holding elites, and hopelessly rigged against labor. 
The Lockheed case was particularly maddening because Lockheed was 
viewed overseas as an arm of the U.S. Department of Defense—thus tying 
 
or seek to locate the best original justification for the legislation. See, e.g., Mike Koehler, The Story of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 929 (2012); Philip M. Nichols, The Neomercantilist Fallacy 
and the Contextual Reality of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 53 HARV. J. LEGIS. 203 (2016); Andrew 
B. Spalding, The Irony of International Business Law: U.S. Progressivism, China’s New Laissez Faire, and 
Their Impact in the Developing World, 59 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 354 (2011).  
 11.  See FRANK VOGL, WAGING A WAR ON CORRUPTION: INSIDE THE MOVEMENT FIGHTING THE 
ABUSE OF POWER 165–67 (Rowman & Littlefield 2012); Abbott & Snidal, Interests and Values, supra 
note 10, at S161; Koehler, The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, supra note 10, at 934–35. 
 12.  Wesley Cragg & William Woof, Legislating against corruption in international markets: The story 
of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CORRUPTION 180, 181–82 
(Arvind K. Jain ed., 2001). 
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corrupt corporate actions to the American government in foreign reporting.13 In 
passing the FCPA, legislators were responding to a future threat as well as 
realized losses. Friendly right-of-center administrations in Japan and Italy had 
lost elections to left-of-center and communist parties after revelations that those 
administrations had accepted bribes from U.S. companies.14 
But the security concerns that led to the passage of the FCPA did not support 
robust enforcement of the law.15 The statute represented one state’s unilateral 
policy regulating foreign markets. While the FCPA provided prosecutors with 
significant extraterritorial jurisdiction, prosecutors’ law enforcement powers 
were still territorially limited. International cooperation is essential to effective 
enforcement. The ability of a state to prosecute a foreign corporation is limited—
particularly if cases depend upon internal corporate records—if neither foreign 
law enforcement officials, nor the company, are helpful. And, at the time, foreign 
governments were not generally helpful. Most Western governments failed to see 
the problem with foreign bribery and refused to impose civil or criminal rules 
against it.16 Indeed, most European governments subsidized foreign bribery by 
making it a tax-deductible business expense.17 
The lack of foreign support for the FCPA created a domestic enforcement 
problem as well. If the statute could only effectively be enforced against U.S. 
corporations, then American businesses faced a significant disadvantage in 
foreign markets.18 A robust enforcement policy would arguably decrease U.S. 
exports, particularly for large government procurement sales contracts—a 
market in which bribes were commonly offered with bids—because only U.S. 
corporations would fear FCPA enforcement. The expanding U.S. trade deficit in 
the early 1980s and the concurrent fear of the loss of American economic 
hegemony to European and Japanese companies further raised the economic 
costs and the political stakes of prosecuting FCPA cases.19 
B. Bribery: International Political Economy And Coordination 
To develop a robust FCPA enforcement program, the U.S. government 
needed international cooperation. Acting alone, Congress could give the statute 
a broad jurisdictional scope, including coverage over all companies who list on a 
U.S. exchange and commit bribery anywhere, but the lack of international 
cooperation made foreign cases difficult to maintain. Without the foreign 
 
 13.  Koehler, The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, supra note 10 at 934–35. 
 14.  VOGL, supra note 11 at 167–68. 
 15.  See Rachel Brewster, Enforcing the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: International Resonance & 
Domestic Prosecutions 13 (unpublished manuscript) (discussing the evolution of FCPA enforcement).  
 16.  Tarullo, supra note 10, at 673–74. 
 17.  Mark Pieth, International Cooperation to Combat Corruption, in CORRUPTION AND THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMY 119, 123–24 (Kimberley Elliot ed., 1997). See also Abbott & Snidal, supra note 10, 
at S167 n.59. 
 18.  Tarullo, supra note 10, at 674; Brewster, supra note 15, at 23. 
 19.  See Ellen Gutterman, Easier Done Than Said: Transnational Bribery, Norm Resonance, and the 
Origins of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 11 FOREIGN POL’Y ANALYSIS 109, 116–17 (2015). 
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company component of the enforcement portfolio, strong FCPA enforcement 
arguably lacked political support. 
From the original passage of the FCPA in 1977, and again in 1988 
amendments to the statute, Congress recognized the need for international 
coordination of anticorruption rules. In 1975 and 1988, Congress called for the 
State Department to engage in state-to-state negotiations to establish an 
international anti-bribery standard that would be enforced in multiple 
jurisdictions.20 The State Department sought to form anti-bribery agreements 
with other states in multiple fora in the 1970s and early 1980s, but with little 
success.21 Within the United Nations, the United States pushed for an 
anticorruption treaty under the auspices of the UN’s Economic and Social 
Council, but it failed to win support among developing states.22 Within the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’s Tokyo Round, the United States 
attempted to bring anticorruption principles into international trade 
negotiations.23 This similarly failed when the United States was unwilling to offer 
greater access to the American market in return. 
The State Department finally decided that the best forum was the OECD, 
which had a smaller membership but included almost all developed states.24 The 
OECD generally only passed non-binding resolutions, so it was not the obvious 
choice if the United States wanted a binding treaty, but it appeared to hold the 
greatest potential for cooperation. Yet even in the OECD, other developed 
governments were unwilling to reconsider their lax approach to foreign bribery 
or even its tax-deductible status. Foreign bribery was simply not an issue that 
other governments saw a need to regulate. 
In the 1990s, however, elite views of the need to address foreign corruption, 
particularly the cost of bribery to development, started to shift. In the 1970s, a 
prevalent view was that corruption could be “market enhancing,” meaning that 
markets would function better if governments, and particularly developing state 
governments, could be pushed out of the marketplace through bribes.25 
That corruption could be market enhancing was not simply an academic view. 
Many Western governments and international institutions concurred. World 
Bank policymakers labeled corruption a political issue, rather than an economic 
 
 20.  Peter W. Schroth, The United States and the International Bribery Conventions, 50 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 593, 596–97, 610 (2002). 
 21.  Pieth, supra note 17, at 122–26; Schroth, supra note 20, at 611. 
 22.  Pieth, supra note 17, at 124. 
 23. Kenneth W. Abbott, Rule-Making in the WTO: Lessons from the Case of Bribery and Corruption, 
4 J. INT’L. ECON. L. 275, 280 (2001); Schroth, supra note 20, at 596–97. 
 24.  See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 10, at S162-69; Pieth, supra note 17, at 122–23; Tarullo, supra 
note 10, at 678–80. 
 25.  See SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 64 (1968); Nathaniel 
H. Leff, Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption, AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 8–14 
(1964); see also J. S. Nye, Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis, 61 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 417, 419–20 (1967) (discussing how corruption could be beneficial in promoting 
entrepreneurship). 
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one.26 Under World Bank decisionmaking procedures, policymakers were 
supposed to avoid “political” issues within the host governments.27 Labeling 
corruption as political allowed the World Bank to implicitly endorse bribery by 
their contractors and ignore the economic effects of corruption on host countries. 
Major Western governments similarly viewed corruption as a constructive means 
of concluding contracts with developing governments and, on the whole, 
understood these relationships to be development promoting, or at least not 
particularly harmful to development goals.28 As a result, American lobbying for 
programs to curtail the corporate supply of bribes was not particularly persuasive. 
The 1990s brought change in this consensus regarding the relationship 
between bribery and the market. Economists and policymakers in international 
institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund started 
to re-evaluate the effects of corruption on development. Instead of trying to push 
the government out of the marketplace, more policymakers discussed the 
constructive role of governments in establishing markets, regulating markets, and 
moderating their effects.29 
Many World Bank policymakers became convinced that corruption was one 
of the greatest obstacles to development rather than market grease.30 Corruption 
incentivized governments to become more engaged in markets (as sources of 
personal monetary gain), biased government spending to projects where large 
bribes were possible, and decreased government accountability.31 In 1996, the 
World Bank reclassified corruption as an economic issue, and adopted a robust 
anti-bribery program that monitored the Bank’s contractors and subcontractors 
for any illicit payments to governments.32 
This shift in thinking also took place outside of governance institutions. A 
number of economists focusing on Africa left the World Bank to form 
Transparency International (TI), an NGO focused on increasing government 
transparency as a means of decreasing corruption.33 TI raised the salience of 
corruption as a political issue, particularly in Western Europe. Similarly, scholars 
such as Susan Rose-Ackerman built a stronger case that bribery was not 
 
 26.  VOGL, supra note 11, at 176; Abbott & Snidal supra note 10, at S159. 
 27.  VOGL, supra note 11, at 176; Abbott & Snidal supra note 10, at S159. 
 28.  See HUNTINGTON, supra note 25; Leff, supra note 25.  
 29.  See Ziya Öni  & Fikret Senses, Rethinking the Emerging Post-Washington Consensus, 36 DEV. 
& CHANGE 263–64, 275–77 (2005). 
 30.  James D. Wolfensohn, People and Development, Address to the Board of Governors at the 
Annual Meetings of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (October 1, 1996), in JAMES 
D. WOLFENSOHN, VOICE FOR THE WORLD’S POOR 50 (The World Bank, 2005) (“And let’s not mince 
words: we need to deal with the cancer of corruption . . . Corruption is a problem that all countries have 
to confront.”).  
 31.  See, e.g., Daniel Kaufmann, Corruption: The Facts, 107 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 144 (1997) 
(discussing the economic effects of corruption in developing countries). 
 32.  Pieth, supra note 17, at 127. 
 33.  See VOGL, supra note 11, at 61–63; see also Abbott & Snidal, supra note 10, at S163–69; Tarullo, 
supra note 10, at 698 (“At present, Transparency International (TI) is the only non-governmental 
organization primarily concerned with corruption.”). 
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economically efficient and harmed developing states.34 These different sources of 
changing political and economic views combined to challenge the older consensus 
and re-conceptualize the role of corruption in the functioning of markets. 
This conceptual change started to gain traction in national governments’ 
policies when a series of corruption scandals erupted in European capitals 
between 1995 and 1996. In Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, domestic 
corruption allegations dominated national politics and became major electoral 
issues in all three countries. Political candidates promised to change their 
governments’ approach to corruption, both nationally and internationally.35 One 
outlet to make good on these promises was the OECD, and U.S. efforts to 
establish an anticorruption agreement there accelerated. OECD members 
agreed to a binding legal instrument (an oddity for the OECD), the Convention 
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions,36 which required each state to adopt its own foreign anti-bribery 
law.37 The Convention, signed in 1997 and entered into force in 1999, also 
required governments to provide each other with legal assistance in prosecuting 
foreign bribery cases.38 
C. Domestic Effects Of The OECD Convention 
The OECD Convention changed the political economy of bringing anti-
bribery cases within the United States.39 The treaty did not meaningfully change 
the extraterritorial scope of the FCPA,40 but it provided the necessary 
international support for a much wider range of cases. In particular, it allowed 
prosecutors to bring cases against American corporations and their overseas 
competitors. U.S. prosecutors did not face diplomatic and political resistance 
from these cases in which the activity had previously been legal and tolerated 
abroad. Further, the DOJ and SEC could seek foreign investigative and other 
legal assistance on anti-bribery cases—assistance they have received even from 
OECD states that have failed to prosecute firms themselves. This change allowed 
the DOJ and the SEC to bring more FCPA cases without steeply raising 
competitive costs for American-based corporations. 
The DOJ has not been shy about advertising its enforcement strategy as “fair” 
to American industry. Former Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer 
explicitly argued that the FCPA did not hurt U.S. business because of the scale 
 
 34.  See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, The economics of corruption, 4 J. PUB. ECON. 187 (1975). 
 35.  Abbott & Snidal, supra note 10, at S163-69; Pieth, supra note 17, at 122–26. 
 36.  Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Convention on Combating Bribery 
of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998) 
(entered into force Feb. 15, 1999) [hereinafter Convention on Combating Bribery]. 
 37.  Tarullo, supra note 10, at 681–82. 
 38.  Convention on Combating Bribery, supra note 36. 
 39.  Brewster, supra note 15, at 23.  
 40.  Congress amended the FCPA in 1998 to ratify the OECD Convention. In doing so, Congress 
expanded the territorial jurisdiction of the statute by expanding the scope of the statute to cover any 
activities that occurred within the territory of the United States. 
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of foreign prosecutions, noting, “[W]e do not only prosecute U.S. companies and 
individuals under the FCPA. Indeed, over the last five years, more than half of 
our corporate FCPA resolutions have involved foreign companies or U.S. 
subsidiaries of foreign companies.”41 Other DOJ officials have similarly stated 
that FCPA prosecutions are aimed at establishing equal liability for foreign and 
domestic firms for foreign bribery. Former Assistant Attorney General Alice 
Fisher argued that targeting foreign firms as well as domestic ones was part of the 
Department’s effort to address corruption’s long-term harm in emerging 
markets.42 
The OECD treaty was an essential part of opening the door to greater 
American enforcement of the FCPA. U.S. prosecutors needed more than the 
broad extraterritorial jurisdiction provided by the statute. They also needed 
foreign support. Other governments had to lend political support to the idea that 
corruption should be prosecuted. In addition, foreign prosecutors and police had 
to help gather evidence and provide other legal assistance. After the passage of 
the OECD Convention, extraterritorial prosecutions for violations of the FCPA 
were more viable. OECD governments were adopting, if not also enforcing, their 
own domestic legislation prohibiting foreign bribery and had formally committed 
themselves to mutual legal assistance.43 And U.S. prosecutors had further 
incentives, particular to their political and professional environments, for 
entering this new legal arena.44 
The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention was critical, not because other OECD 
countries began prosecuting cases themselves but because they started 
supporting U.S. cases.45 Although the FCPA offered prosecutors extraterritorial 
jurisdiction to pursue these cases before the OECD Convention, prosecutors had 
generally adopted a restrained approach. The treaty invigorated the FCPA by 
giving American prosecutors the means to take a much more aggressive position 
towards domestic and foreign firms without being seen as disproportionately 
harming American industry.46 
  
 
 41.  Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney General, Address at the 24th National Conference on the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 16, 2010). 
 42.  See Nelson D. Schwartz & Lowell Bergman, Payload: Taking Aim at Corporate Bribery, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 25, 2007). 
 43.  TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL (TI), EXPORTING CORRUPTION, PROGRESS REPORT 2015: 
ASSESSING ENFORCEMENT OF THE OECD CONVENTION ON COMBATTING FOREIGN BRIBERY 15–16 
(2015). See also notes 84–86, infra.  
 44.  See infra part III. 
 45.  Brewster, supra note 15, at 20. 
 46.  Id. 
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III 
A DOMESTIC INDUSTRY GROWS 
A. Domestic Political Economy Of Federal Prosecution 
As the international normative and legal frameworks around bribery shifted, 
the legal and political stages were set for U.S. prosecutors and enforcers to 
attempt to dominate the field of international anti-bribery enforcement 
beginning in the 1990s. That the stage was set did not necessarily entail that they 
would occupy it. Domestic developments were also instrumental. This part first 
examines the motivations of government agencies and individual prosecutors in 
taking up FCPA cases. It then turns to the symbiotic relationship between 
prosecutors and the criminal defense bar in reporting and resolving FCPA cases. 
With that relationship established, the defense bar, as in other areas of corporate 
crime, has continued to play a major role in pushing a steady volume of 
enforcement actions into the U.S. legal system. 
1. Top Down 
For at least the last two administrations, the executive branch has pursued an 
express policy to prioritize and increase prosecutions of FCPA violations by large 
corporations.47 Both White House staffs and the political appointee suites in the 
DOJ have described this policy initiative as an effort to root out corruption and 
bribery in global commerce.48 The effort has included more FCPA prosecutions, 
almost all of which concluded in settlements; hiring of more FCPA prosecutors;49 
and increased efforts to use civil legal mechanisms to freeze and seize the assets 
of corrupt foreign officials (the Department’s so-called “kleptocracy” 
initiative50). This impetus from policy levels has been important, perhaps even 
essential, to growth of the field. Prosecutors’ interests, left unchanneled, could 
  
 
 47.  See, e.g., Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney General, Address at the 24th National 
Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 16, 2010); The White House of George W. Bush, 
The Millennium Challenge Account, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/developing 
nations/millennium.html [https://perma.cc/QRE7-6YQ8]. 
 48.  See, e.g, Tonya Somander, President Obama’s Efforts on Financial Transparency and Anti-
Corruption: What You Need to Know (May 6, 2016), whitehouse.gov; U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Eric Holder 
Delivers Remarks at the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (May 31, 2010), 
available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-holder-delivers-remarks-organisation-
economic-co-operation-and [https://perma.cc/684V-3Q9E]; U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Assistant Attorney 
General Lanny A. Breuer Speaks at the United Nations for International Anti-corruption Day (Dec. 9, 
2010), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-lanny-breuer-speaks-unitednations 
-international-anti [https://perma.cc/4TZJ-CYLR]; U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Assistant Attorney General 
Leslie R. Caldwell Speaks at American Conference Institute’s 31st International Conference on the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 19, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-
leslie-r-caldwell-speaks-american-conference-institute-s-31st [https://perma.cc/RE32-7MSH]. 
 49.  U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Division, Fraud Section, The Fraud Section’s Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act Enforcement Plan and Guidance (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/ 
838386/download [https://perma.cc/YT3M-MKPV]. 
 50.  Joe Palazzolo, DOJ’s Kleptocracy Unit Unveiled, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 7, 2011). 
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have led them to prioritize other forms of corporate misconduct than bribery of foreign 
officials. 
A longstanding and atypical coordinating device has empowered this top-
down initiative. The United States Attorneys’ Manual is an ostensibly binding set 
of rules concerning the conduct of federal prosecutors that is nonetheless 
unenforceable in court. In relevant part, it prohibits instituting a criminal 
investigation or prosecution for violation of the FCPA without the “express 
authorization” of DOJ’s Criminal Division in Washington, wherein an office 
called the Fraud Section supervises FCPA prosecutions as well as initiates many 
of them.51 The Manual contains this sort of control provision for only a few 
federal criminal statutes, which are otherwise enforced at the pleasure of United 
States Attorneys and other supervisory federal prosecutors without Washington 
interference. The Manual explains that centralized control and monitoring are 
needed in this instance because “violations of the FCPA will raise complex 
enforcement problems abroad as well as difficult issues of jurisdiction and 
statutory construction” and may involve “high-level foreign government 
officials.”52 
The rationale for DOJ’s control rule for FCPA cases may be outdated. Many 
federal prosecutions, from business crime to drugs to terrorism to piracy, now 
routinely implicate the same concerns about interaction with other nations. 
Prosecutors are free to wield many statutes abroad without DOJ Criminal 
Division supervision, as for example with the use of the wire fraud statute to 
prosecute the FIFA corruption cases in the Eastern District of New York.53 
Prosecutors could evade the Manual’s requirements, in some corruption cases at 
least, simply by choosing a different legal theory. But now, as a result of DOJ’s 
longstanding FCPA policy, bureaucratic institutions are firmly in place: a fully 
staffed Fraud Section in Washington understands its mandate to include robust 
FCPA enforcement. Consequently, FCPA enforcement does not depend on the 
perhaps changing priorities of United States Attorneys and their staffs over time. 
One can take Washington’s FCPA initiative at face value without having to 
take it entirely seriously. That is to say, it is possible that officials in the Clinton, 
Bush, and Obama Administrations have believed that the U.S. legal system can 
make corruption less endemic in large commercial transactions in the developing 
world. That might seem quixotic, a bit like using a hand pump to drain Lake 
Michigan. The scale of global corruption plainly overwhelms the Department’s 
thirty or forty lawyers bringing their dozen or two prosecutions per year. But 
perhaps there is some logic, or at least sincerity, in the DOJ’s effort. If enough 
large corporations sufficiently fear even one potentially devastating FCPA 
 
 51.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-47.000 (1997), 
https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-47000-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-1977 [https://perma.cc/X42H-
48NE].  
 52.  Id. 
 53.  See Indictment, United States v. Webb, et al., No. 15 CR 0252 (RJD) (RML) (E.D.N.Y. May 20, 
2015). 
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prosecution—and their managers certainly have been complaining incessantly 
about that legal risk—they might start to refuse to play the corruption game in 
enough important markets that some of those markets will begin to change. 
Critics might say that DOJ’s political appointees have become enamored with 
the FCPA because of its prosecution friendliness, jurisdictional breadth, and 
relatively low bar for liability. The SEC’s power to gather evidence of the same 
violations in parallel civil enforcement proceedings has further made FCPA cases 
the low-hanging fruit of corporate crime. If one wants to look like one is 
prosecuting major corporate crimes, the FCPA provides a much easier path than, 
for example, deploying the laws governing securities fraud against large banks 
for marketing failed mortgage-backed securities. In addition, DOJ appointees in 
Washington have unusually direct control over the Fraud Section, a unit that has 
a specialized charter and expertise in FCPA cases, which can be used by DOJ to 
initiate corporate prosecutions. 
A similar dynamic could affect the SEC’s priorities, perhaps even more. The 
SEC has jurisdiction only over the securities laws, which include the FCPA but 
also, most importantly, the laws against securities fraud. Without diverting into 
the doctrinal details, FCPA violations are generally far easier to prove than 
securities fraud. This is especially true in SEC actions because the FCPA includes 
a provision—frequently invoked by the SEC but rarely by the DOJ—that makes 
it a violation of the statute simply to fail to maintain “books and records” that 
are accurate in all material respects.54 The SEC commonly invokes this provision, 
which is nearly impossible for defendants to contest, as a fallback or settlement 
option when it initiates FCPA cases. 
Finally, there is the most cynical view. There are some abroad, especially in 
Europe, who believe that the United States may be using global corporate 
enforcement, especially FCPA enforcement, as a means of assisting U.S. firms in 
the competition for dominance among multi-nationals. Some have maintained 
that the U.S. policy of prosecuting foreign firms is discriminatory and violates 
general international legal principles of equal treatment before the law.55 
One study involving a large original data set found that foreign firms tended 
to suffer higher penalties than U.S. firms in DOJ resolutions.56 However, as the 
author was careful to discuss, potential selection effects complicate inferences 
from this data.57 Foreign firms represented only eighteen percent of the corporate 
defendants in the study, and it is plausible that American prosecutors tend to 
prosecute only larger cases against foreign firms while prosecuting a more diverse 
set of domestic firms. 
 
 54.  15 U.S.C. § 78m. The idea behind this provision was that corporations could be deterred from 
bribery if they knew they would face liability for failing to book illicit payments—book it and get caught 
or refuse to and get in trouble for failing to book something, whether or not the SEC could prove bribery. 
 55.  Annalisa Leibold, The Extraterritorial Application of the FCPA Under International Law, 51 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 225, 226 (2015). 
 56.  Garrett, supra note 8, at 1810. 
 57.  Id. 
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Another study of FCPA settlements found that the DOJ assessed greater 
penalties against foreign firms than domestic ones, even accounting for the size 
of the bribe and whether the firm voluntarily disclosed the illegal activity.58 These 
authors also wondered about some of the many questions such findings raise. For 
instance, do U.S. regulators make stronger cases against foreign firms due to 
coordination with foreign regulators? Are U.S. firms more successful than 
foreign ones at lowering their sanctions in settlement because of greater 
sophistication in dealing with U.S. regulators? 
For a brute capture story to be convincing, one would need to point to a path 
through which U.S. firms influence the decisions of line prosecutors about which 
firms to choose as targets for FCPA actions. The structure and professional 
culture of DOJ divisions and U.S. Attorney’s Offices, as well as the civil service 
protections enjoyed by career prosecutors, are not amenable to this kind of 
influence. As a matter of course, these offices do not provide opportunities for 
advocates of U.S. firms, such as the Chamber of Commerce, an opportunity to be 
heard in matters of prosecutorial discretion. The SEC gives its potential 
defendants the opportunity to formally argue against enforcement action in a 
written document to the Commissioners themselves called a Wells submission.59 
But these are litigation documents—briefs on the legal merits—not lobbying 
submissions designed to exploit interest group pressures. 
In respect to their enforcement arms, the DOJ and SEC differ significantly 
from other executive branch institutions like the Departments of Agriculture or 
Commerce in which industry groups routinely enjoy transparent access to 
decisionmaking and, by law, to the rulemaking process. Conventional political 
discourse in Washington, at least in its rhetoric, condemns efforts to “politicize” 
the government’s prosecution of criminal offenses. Accordingly, the White 
House routinely and vocally disavows any influence over Justice Department 
investigations and prosecutions. Any skew of FCPA case selection towards 
foreign firms would thus have to result from subtler and perhaps unconscious 
effects on the decisions of line prosecutors and enforcers. 
2. Bottom Up 
The U.S. corporate crime prosecutor operates within the context of a 
particular political economy. The prosecutor also works within an influential 
professional economy. In investigations of why the government has so quickly 
increased the volume of FCPA enforcement matters, the forces of this economy 
have been underemphasized if not unnoticed. For several reasons, the legal 
professional economy has been directing the federal prosecutor’s attentions 
overseas in recent years. 
The typical, though not mandatory, career path of the white collar prosecutor 
in Main Justice or a major U.S. Attorney’s Office is as follows: graduation with a 
 
 58.  Choi & Davis, supra note 8, at 437–39. 
 59.  See U.S. Secs. & Exchange Comm’n, Division of Enforcement, Enforcement Manual (June 4, 
2015) at § 2.4. 
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strong academic record from a top law school, often followed by a federal judicial 
clerkship; several years as an associate at a global or at least national law firm 
with a corporate practice, often including junior work on the defense of 
corporations and their managers in civil and criminal government enforcement 
actions; a stint of somewhere between four and ten years as a federal prosecutor; 
and then, for most, a partner or of-counsel position at the same sort of large law 
firm. More recently, others have taken up senior in-house counsel or compliance 
positions at major corporations as companies have discovered the benefits of 
having the advice and experience of former prosecutors and enforcement lawyers 
readily at hand. 
This is the so-called “revolving door” of corporate white collar practice. This 
door has come to spin faster as the practice of defending corporations in internal 
investigations and enforcement matters has mushroomed over the last two 
decades, now constituting a major slice of the revenues of America’s 100 largest 
law firms.60 
There is a familiar capture story told about this career arc. In her first period 
of law firm service, the young lawyer becomes inculcated with the views of the 
corporate sector towards criminal enforcement. She thus begins government 
service with an ideological slant in favor of the plight of the white collar target 
over others in the criminal justice system. Then, as she advances through the 
Justice Department ranks and begins to meet corporate adversaries across the 
table and on the rare occasion in court, she inevitably begins to think about the 
implications of her relationships with those adversaries for her exit from the 
government. Wishing to curry favor with future employers, she cultivates a 
reputation for “reasonableness” by crediting arguments she hears from opposing 
counsel and settling most or all of her cases with corporate defendants and their 
managers on lenient terms. 
This facially plausible story omits important facts, principally on two 
dimensions: the psychology of this cohort of lawyers and the actual market for 
former Justice Department prosecutors. First, as to psychology, this lawyer tends 
to be ambitious and interested in government practice for the opportunity it 
affords to impact some corner of social policy. These are people who went to law 
school “to make a difference” and who eventually realize that, given their 
material and familial goals in life, their relatively short stint in government may 
end up being their one chance to do something big and important. This is a 
powerful drive and it directs the lawyer into big cases and towards trials and 
punitive sentences, not away from them. If these highly credentialed lawyers only 
care about material rewards, they have easier and more lucrative paths readily 
available to them in the private sector without enduring the more Spartan 
conditions of government service. 
  
 
 60.  Charles D. Weisselberg & Su Li, Big Law’s Sixth Amendment: The Rise of Corporate White-
Collar Practices in Large U.S. Law Firms, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 1221, 1249–53 (2011). 
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Federal law is highly amenable to these motivations. The American 
prosecutor is famously the king or queen of discretion: discretion to decide whom 
to prosecute for what offenses and whom to leave unmolested by legal action. 
Though the SEC’s processes are more bureaucratized than those of the DOJ, 
initial discretion also rests with the securities enforcement attorney. The 
discretionary authority to charge is both initial—in the sense that the prosecutor 
starts the case and the case does not start without the prosecutor—and nearly 
absolute—in the sense that judicial review of the charging or declination decision 
is available only for invidious discrimination and never for qualitative judgment.61 
No prosecutor is vested with more of this discretion than the federal 
prosecutor charged with handling corporate crime. That prosecutor, whether she 
works in one of the Justice Department’s ninety-three U.S. Attorney’s Offices 
spread across the land or in one of the offices at “Main Justice” in Washington 
that deal exclusively with business crime, has no conventional lawyer’s caseload 
that is brought to her for prosecution by agents of a roving police force. Instead, 
in consultation with investigative agents, civil enforcement agencies, and her 
colleagues and supervisors, she chooses the few cases she wishes to expend her 
time and energies pursuing. Indeed, she enjoys not just the discretion to 
prosecute but also the discretion to investigate in the first instance. 
In the sphere of international business, the jurisdictional provisions of the 
relevant statutes allow the federal prosecutor to consider extending her reach to 
a great deal of conduct that occurs abroad. American criminal law treats most 
complex white collar crimes, especially if conspiracy charges are involved, as 
“continuing offenses” that are committed at all places and times when and where 
acts occur during the period of the offense.62 Often all the prosecutor needs to 
file her indictment in a U.S. district court is a wiring through that district, or a 
company’s incorporation or headquartering in the United States, or in the case 
of the FCPA, some material part of the bribery offense that was “within the 
territory of the United States.”63 
As for principles of international law regarding states’ assertions of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, United States law affords them a very limited role in 
this area—using them at most as tie-breakers on close questions of statutory 
interpretation. Congress is free to legislate extraterritorially; there is no 
Constitutional prohibition against it. However, Congress must clearly state such 
intention to overcome a judicially enforced presumption against extraterritorial 
application of statutes.64 As a body of legislation expressly designed to reach 
overseas, the FCPA easily fits this bill. 
 
 61.  See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464–65 (1996); United States v. Batchelder, 442 
U.S. 114, 124 (1979); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 367, 365 (1978); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 
742, 752–53 (1970). 
 62.  18 U.S.C. § 3237; United States v. Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp., 871 F.2d 1181, 1190 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 63.  15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a) (2012). 
 64.  See Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 248 (2010); Pasquantino v. United 
States, 544 U.S. 349, 371 (2005); Lauren Ann Ross, Note, Using Foreign Relations Law to Limit 
Extraterritorial Applications of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 62 DUKE L.J. 445, 471–75 (2012). 
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In criminal law, possession of the body is nine-tenths of the law when it comes 
to jurisdiction to adjudicate. Only the individual defendant who manages to 
position himself beyond successful extradition proceedings will end up in a 
winning posture. A recent study found only one case in which a federal court 
rewarded a defendant’s due process challenge to the assertion of U.S. criminal 
jurisdiction over him.65 Even kidnaped defendants have been denied 
jurisdictional relief once the government has, by brute force, successfully 
positioned them before U.S. courts.66 Extraterritorial prosecution—or, perhaps 
better, prosecution with minimal territorial contact—is, as a matter of law, readily 
available to American prosecutors deploying the FCPA. 
Like many bureaucratic actors who exercise substantial discretion, the federal 
business crime prosecutor acts for a combination of reasons, some that are direct 
and purposeful and others that arise indirectly. The sum total of the enforcement 
decisions of “line” attorneys is an essential aspect of government policy. 
Enforcement, it bears emphasis, is a type of law or at least a lawmaking practice.67 
Federal prosecutors understand their mandate to be solvers of big problems. 
It is hard to say exactly where this understanding comes from, other than a 
combination of their enormous legal discretion, enduring traditions and cultures 
of the offices in which they work, and the reality that in the U.S. system, federal 
law enforcement is a complement to state law enforcement and is rarely seen as 
the first line of defense against any form of routine crime.68 It is natural that the 
problem-solving federal prosecutor would see problems of corporate 
malfeasance and the public demand for legal responses to those problems as an 
attractive and useful place to direct her resources—especially where those 
problems appear to result in part from the failures or even absences of non-
criminal regulatory programs. 
Whether she arrives in the government with it or it is inculcated through 
mentoring and institutional norms, the federal prosecutor has a particularly 
strong affinity to the idea that maintenance of the rule of law requires respect for 
 
 65.  Michael Farbiarz, Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction, 114 MICH. L. REV. 507, 516–17 (2016). 
Farbiarz argues that, contrary to recent practice, courts should treat this constitutional “nexus” 
requirement as irrelevant (or easily satisfied) in most cases since a defendant prosecuted in the United 
States for conduct also criminalized in the principal location of the offense cannot claim any unfair 
surprise. 
 66.  United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1212–13 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Frisbie v. Collins, 342 
U.S. 519, 522 (1952) (“This Court has never departed from the rule . . . that the power of a court to try a 
person for crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been brought within the court’s jurisdiction by 
reason of a ‘forcible abduction.’”). 
 67.  See Daniel C. Richman, Accounting for Prosecutors (Colum. L. Sch. Pub. L. & Legal Theory 
Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 14-506, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=2757811 [https://perma.cc/PWG9-E6QJ]; Margaret H. Lemos, Accountability and 
Independence in Public Enforcement (Duke L. Sch. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 2016-23, 
2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2748720 [https://perma.cc/53LF-WAAE]. 
 68.  See generally Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2117 (1998); Daniel C. Richman, Prosecutors and their Agents, Agents and their Prosecutors, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 749 (2003); Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on 
the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2005).  
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and compliance with the law, especially among the wealthy and powerful. Indeed, 
the DOJ’s entire policy rubric for dealing with corporate criminal liability starts 
from the principle that the joint promotion by the Department and firms of “good 
corporate citizenship” is a basic premise of social welfare.69 Thus the Department 
was willing, for example, to devote years—with mixed success but some 
important victories—to taking on a series of novel and extremely difficult cases 
of sophisticated tax shelter design, a perhaps paradigm instance of complex legal 
evasion.70 
Given this posture towards evasion, it is predictable that the Department’s 
lawyers would have begun to worry about cross-border forms of regulatory 
arbitrage, or other means by which firms might seek shelter from harsher U.S. 
laws in more legally favorable jurisdictions or ones that are harder for U.S. 
prosecutors to reach as a practical matter. The view of the American federal 
prosecutor about large corporations that are based or doing business in the 
United States, or even using the U.S. financial system, could hardly be farther 
from the old parental policy of “I can’t stop you but don’t do it in my house.” 
This approach is likely to extend to activities involving bribery, something a 
federal prosecutor will understand to be a core domestic criminal offense under 
federal law as well as statutes in all state jurisdictions.71 The idea that companies 
could be freely gaining business across the globe through the kinds of criminal 
payments they would not dream of attempting to convey to U.S. officials would 
strike the prosecutor as a glaring case of criminal evasion and extremely bad 
corporate citizenship.72 She then need only turn briefly to the FCPA to see that 
Congress has provided her with a ready means to venture out on a campaign to 
block that kind of evasion. 
A second area of misunderstanding with regard to the revolving door 
concerns the job market. Former prosecutors who have done complex, 
demanding, adversarial cases are much more valuable to firms than those who 
have not done such work. Firms and their corporate clients want experience in 
the trenches, not lawyers who made careers out of standing down. They need 
those who know how to dig deep and relentlessly in investigations and how to 
judge whether a case is worth fighting to the end or must be settled—which 
requires meaningful trial experience. Most of all, large law firms and their clients 
seek lawyers who will carry the highest credibility into negotiations with 
prosecutors and other government officials. Among their former colleagues, 
DOJ prosecutors and SEC lawyers will listen most attentively to those they 
respect the most for having worked the hardest and on the biggest cases during 
past government service. 
 
 69.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-28.000. 
 70.  See TANINA ROSTAIN & MILTON C. REGAN, JR., CONFIDENCE GAMES: LAWYERS, 
ACCOUNTANTS, AND THE TAX SHELTER INDUSTRY 273–75 (2014). 
 71.  18 U.S.C. §§ 201, 666; e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 200.04. 
 72.  See Stuart P. Green, Official and Commercial Bribery: Should They Be Distinguished?, in 
MODERN BRIBERY LAW: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 219 (J. Horder & P. Alldridge eds., 2013). 
BREWSTERBUELL_FORMATTED_PREPROOF_PERMA (DO NOT DELETE) 3/14/2017  2:43 PM 
210 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 80: 193 
Although FCPA prosecutions have the substantial drawback of rarely 
affording trial experience, they are among the most complicated and sprawling 
investigations federal prosecutors can be tasked with handling. Their scale and 
international dimension present particular problems that generate a particular 
experience and expertise that are prized by large law firms. 
It is widely believed that FCPA defense may be the most expensive and thus 
lucrative service that law firms sell in the field of internal investigations and 
defense against government enforcement. For example, Siemens spent at least $1 
billion on professional services, mostly provided by the law firm Debevoise & 
Plimpton and the accounting firm Deloitte, in dealing with its massive bribery 
scandal.73 Walmart has spent at least $400 million so far managing its FCPA 
problem relating to bribery in Mexico, and the meter is still running on that 
unresolved case.74 
In winning these rewarding representations from corporate clients, firms will 
want to demonstrate that their stable of partners includes former DOJ lawyers 
who handled the largest, most complicated, and most global FCPA matters. The 
senior prosecutor naturally will understand that grabbing some of those cases in 
the prime of her prosecutorial career will position her well for a secure career 
following government service.75 
B. Symbiosis In The Corporate Crime Bar 
In the case of FCPA enforcement, the relationship between the private and 
public sectors is more complex than, and perhaps just as powerful as, the 
metaphorical revolving door by which the private captures the public. This 
symbiotic relationship characterizes the enforcement of corporate criminal 
offenses, and their civil analogues, in general. It arises from a kind of organic 
process over the last several decades by which the government, through 
incremental moves by enforcement lawyers and their defense counterparts, has 
come to cope with the massive problem of detecting and investigating corporate 
wrongdoing. 
In short, the government uses corporate criminal liability as a lever to compel 
firms to monitor their own employees, discover wrongdoing, and report it to the 
government.76 In turn, the government allows firms to settle criminal matters 
 
 73.  See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Department’s Sentencing Memorandum, United States v. Siemens 
(D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2008). 
 74.  Davis Voreacos & Renee Dudley, Wal-Mart Says Bribe Probe Cost $439 Million in Two Years, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Mar. 26, 2014), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-03-26/wal-mart-says-
bribery-probe-cost-439-million-in-past-two-years [https://perma.cc/G9FM-5PZC]. 
 75.  Joe Palazzolo, FCPA Inc.: The Business of Bribery, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 12, 2012) (quoting one 
major law firm partner, “If you get one or two of these [FCPA matters] a year as a partner, you’re pretty 
much set. You’re not going to break any records, but you’re doing well.”). 
 76.  BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS TARGET CORPORATIONS 14 
(2014); Jennifer Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability: Theory and Evidence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK 
ON THE ECONOMICS OF CRIMINAL LAW 144 (A. Harel & K. Hylton eds., 2012); Jennifer Arlen & Reinier 
Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 687, 690–92 (1997); Samuel W. Buell, Criminal Procedure Within the Firm, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1613, 
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before indictment and prosecution and on somewhat more lenient terms. Firms 
trade self-policing and self-reporting for lower sanctions. 
It is unlikely that anyone, including law firm managers themselves, foresaw in 
the early 1990s that a tremendous explosion was coming in the practice of 
corporate criminal defense. Nevertheless, the emergence of this now-bastion of 
major law firm practice was a natural result of the government’s designed strategy 
to deal with large-scale corporate crime. A sophisticated bar with expertise in 
both investigating crime and negotiating with prosecutors, enforcement lawyers, 
and their supervisory agencies was essential for this process to function and grow. 
A highly influential, though not strictly necessary, factor in the growth of this 
process was the government’s emphasis on self-reporting. Again and again, in 
speeches, policy manuals, press releases, and settlement documents, DOJ 
officials have stated that corporations will be rewarded for bringing criminal 
conduct to the attention of the government and penalized for failing to do so in 
instances in which the government learns of the conduct independently through 
whistleblowers, press reports, regulatory inspections, informants, civil lawsuits, 
and other avenues.77 DOJ has been particularly eager to emphasize this point in 
the FCPA context, where it is believed that far-flung international bribery might 
be impossible to discover in most cases without corporate confessions.78 
Sometimes this approach may backfire; practitioners now talk about whether a 
client’s self-reporting of an FCPA violation can cause the government to insist 
upon a far more expensive and exhaustive investigation than the company would 
have undertaken on its own accord.79 
Whether the prosecutors and the defense bar—in their constant skirmishing 
over the wisdom of particular cases and contours of FCPA doctrine—are willing 
to admit so or not, they need each other. Without predictable enforcement of the 
statute, as well as aggressive programs to reward self-reporting, FCPA practice 
groups at large law firms cannot justify their expensive efforts to their corporate 
clients. Without a large defense bar that gathers evidence, reports to the 
government, and otherwise facilitates enforcement, DOJ and SEC would be able 
to bring only a few of the cases they currently pursue and collect only a fraction 
of the sanctions that flow into the government’s coffers. While this dynamic 
applies to all corporate crime, it is especially influential in the FCPA context. 
FCPA cases involve evidence located abroad that is vastly more onerous for 
 
1618 (2007). 
 77.  E.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-28.000. See also U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Memorandum of the Deputy Attorney General on Individual Accountability for 
Corporate Wrongdoing, Sept. 9, 2015 (“Yates Memo”), https://www.justice.gov/ 
dag/file/769036/download [https://perma.cc/CD5N-JQQU]; U.S. Secs. & Exchange Comm’n, Division of 
Enforcement, Enforcement Manual (June 4, 2015) at § 6; U.S. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, Securities & 
Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 44969 (Oct. 23, 2001) (“Seaboard Report”). 
 78.  U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Criminal Division, Fraud Section, The Fraud Section’s Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act Enforcement Plan and Guidance (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/file/838386/download [https://perma.cc/2CZP-6F3W]. 
 79.  Che Odom, Companies Alter Approach to Bribery Due to DOJ Push, BLOOMBERG BNA 
WHITE COLLAR CRIME REPORT, May 4, 2016. 
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enforcers to obtain through official legal channels than through voluntary 
disclosure by the companies that possess it. 
What is most interesting about the professional economy in FCPA 
enforcement—and must remain less than fully explained for now—is that this 
symbiosis seems to have arisen later and independently of any initial impetus to 
enforce the FCPA. That is, the chicken of the international and domestic politics 
of anticorruption enforcement came before the egg of a large (and still maturing) 
professional legal establishment for generating and handling FCPA cases. Yet, as 
of now, it might be said that developed institutions for prosecuting and 
sanctioning international business corruption are driving the American initiative 
as much as, or even more than, any centrally designed policy program—much less 
the now somewhat lost origins of the FCPA legislation itself. 
IV 
CONCLUSION: COMPETITION IN THE ENFORCEMENT MARKET EMERGES 
The United States remains the most important enforcer of foreign 
anticorruption laws by a significant margin.80 The United States has brought more 
cases both total and relative to its world exports, and has imposed greater 
penalties than any other state.81 Though success in establishing a global 
enforcement market was made possible by the OECD treaty’s requirement for 
mutual legal assistance and cooperation, the treaty has not been equally effective 
in convincing other OECD members to enforce their own foreign anticorruption 
laws. The majority of OECD states still have little to no enforcement of their own 
foreign anti-bribery laws.82 Both the OECD Anti-Bribery Working Group and 
Transparency International have documented how most members of the treaty 
have failed to provide any political support or material resources to foreign anti-
bribery prosecutions.83 
Within the last decade, however, a few countries have begun to prioritize 
anticorruption law. Germany, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom have all 
significantly revised their laws and started investing political capital in 
investigations and prosecutions. Some of these cases have been brought in active 
coordination with U.S. authorities but others involve independent investigations 
and sanctions. Notably, several states have amended their laws to permit 
increased flexibility for prosecutors to settle cases. For instance, the United 
Kingdom revised its Foreign Anti-Bribery Act in 2011 to permit deferred 
 
 80.  TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 43, at 15–16. 
 81.  Id.  
 82.  Id. See also Rachel Brewster, The Domestic and International Enforcement of the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention, 15 CHI. J. INT’L L. 84, 100 (2014) (detailing the record of domestic enforcement in 
OECD countries). 
 83.  The OECD Anti-Bribery Working Group publishes phase 1, 2, and 3 reports on each OECD 
treaty member. See, e.g., OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY 
CONVENTION IN HUNGARY 22 (2012). See also TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 43, at 15–
16. 
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prosecution agreements as seen in the United States.84 The French government 
is also attempting to revise its anti-bribery laws, the so-called Loi Sapin II.85 The 
French proposal would establish a foreign anti-bribery agency with power to 
enter into non-prosecution agreements and U.S.-style corporate monitoring.86 
It remains uncertain whether greater foreign prosecution efforts will 
complement or challenge the current U.S. dominance in anti-bribery 
enforcement. So far, other OECD states’ efforts seem to be complementary. 
Many early European bribery prosecutions were brought in conjunction with 
U.S. investigations and prosecutions—for instance, the Siemens case with the 
German government87 and the BAE case with the UK government.88 In addition, 
one empirical study of foreign government behavior found that coordination with 
the United States on a bribery case was the best predictor that a state would later 
bring its own independent prosecutions.89 
Yet the possibility of future tensions exists. Foreign governments are starting 
to question whether U.S. authorities are even-handed in their sanctioning of 
foreign corporations and may grow more protective of their own exporters.90 
With the increase in home-grown prosecutions, foreign governments may believe 
that they have a greater authority to prosecute many of these cases and resist the 
application of extraterritorial American law. Such issues may hamper American 
prosecutors’ ability to maintain their global portfolio of cases, but it may also lead 
to stronger anticorruption enforcement overall. 
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Perspective, in DEBATES OF CORRUPTION AND INTEGRITY 73 (Peter Hardi et al. eds., 2015). See also 
Charlie Monteith, Bribery and Corruption: The UK Framework for Enforcement, in MODERN BRIBERY 
LAW: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 263 (J. Horder & P. Allridge eds., 2013). Monteith also reports that 
the UK did not prosecute overseas bribery cases before 2008, but then after 2008, the Serious Fraud 
Office collected over 100 million pounds in penalties and recoveries. Id. at 257.  
 85.  La loi Sapin 2 contre la corruption arrive à l’Assemblée nationale, LEMONDE.FR (June 6, 2016, 
4:55 PM), http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2016/06/06/la-loi-sapin-ii-contre-la-corruption-arrive-
a-l-assemblee-nationale_4938050_823448.html [https://perma.cc/X8KT-SFLQ]. 
 86.  Id. See also Brian Whisler & Jessica Norrtant-Eyme, Anticipating New French Anti-Corruption 
Rules: France Signals Willingness to Strengthen Legislation to Combat Bribery and Corruption, GLOBAL 
COMPLIANCE NEWS (Sept. 15, 2015), https://globalcompliancenews.com/anticipating-new-french-anti-
corruption-rules-france-signals-willingness-to-strengthen-legislation-to-combat-bribery-and-corruption/ 
[https://perma.cc/HB62-PWV5]. 
 87.  Dep’t of Justice Press Release, Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 Million in Combined Criminal Fines, Dec. 18, 
2008 (discussing the case’s joint conclusion with Germany authorities). 
 88.  See Christopher Drew & Nicola Clark, BAE Settles Corruption Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 
2010, at B1 (discussing BAE’s settlement with the DOJ and UK authorities).  
 89.  Sarah C. Kaczmarek & Abraham L. Newman, The long arm of the law: Extraterritoriality and 
the national implementation of foreign bribery legislation, 65 INT’L ORG. 745, 760 (2011). 
 90.  This tension was already on display between the U.S. and the UK governments over the BAE 
case. The Blair government ordered the UK Serious Frauds Office to halt its investigation of BAE due 
to national security concerns. American authorities refused to respect the UK government’s authority to 
release BAE from liability, however, and brought its own investigation. This political fight was resolved 
in part because the Blair government’s decision was very unpopular domestically. Critics maintained the 
government was undermining the rule of law. Ultimately the UK decided to re-open its investigation of 
BAE and coordinate with the American prosecution.   
BREWSTERBUELL_FORMATTED_PREPROOF_PERMA (DO NOT DELETE) 3/14/2017  2:43 PM 
214 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 80: 193 
At present, the political economy of anti-bribery prosecutions in foreign 
jurisdictions, and thus the international market for anticorruption enforcement, 
is still developing. The United States may not continue to enjoy relatively 
unfettered control over and access to legal matters involving bribery in 
international business affairs. More participants in the market for global anti-
bribery enforcement may change the dynamic for prosecutors in unpredictable 
ways.  However, a broadening international base for pursuing foreign corruption 
may also boost the legitimacy and effectiveness of anti-bribery regimes to the 
mutual benefit of all.  Although global corruption is notoriously hard to measure, 
it is safe to say that present levels of prosecution have not begun to plumb its 
depths. 
 
